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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution 
Article 1, Section 12; Utah Code Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and 
Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion 
to dismiss the information. Defendant argued that the prior 
convictions used could not be used to enhance the offense to a 
felony. The basis for such argument is as follows: 
1. The date of the current offense was August 30, 2003. The 
first conviction was based on conduct occurring June 22, 
1993. The dates of offense was outside the 10 year 
mandated period. 
2. The date of conviction of the first offense was April 26, 1994 
and the date of the current conviction is May 26, 2005. If the 
trial court used the date of conviction as the critical date, the 
3) 
date of this conviction exceeded ten (10) years from the first 
conviction. 
3. The first conviction was based on a plea of guilty to the 
offense of reckless driving. The record was not clear if the 
conviction was alcohol related or not. The defendant argued 
that the Court could not use this conviction to enhance the 
offense due to such ambiguity. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The defendant entered a plea of guilty to the offense of DUI as 
a third degree felony but reserved the right to appeal the Court's 
denial of his motion to dismiss or strike the felony enhancements. 
FACTUAL STATEMENT 
The date of the current offense alleged a commission date of 
August 30, 2003. The State enhanced the DUI to a felony alleging 
the defendant had two prior convictions for DUI. However, the 
statute requires three convictions within the noted ten (10) years. 
The first conviction (1993) was based on conduct occurring 
June 22, 1993. The date of the current offense was outside the 
mandated 10 year (June 1993—August 2003). 
However, the date of conviction of the first offense was April 
26, 1994 and the date of the current conviction is May 26, 2005. If 
the trial court used the 'date of conviction' as the critical date, the 
date of this conviction exceeded ten (10) years from the first 
conviction. 
The first conviction was based on a plea of guilty to the offense 
of reckless driving. The Court docket recorded the offense as a 
straight reckless driving. However, one note recorded in the docket 
referenced the conviction as an alcohol related reckless driving. 
The record was not clear if the conviction was alcohol related or not. 
The defendant argued that the Court could not use this conviction to 
enhance the offense due to such ambiguity. No other documents 
support are present to indicate the conviction as being alcohol 
related or not. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The statute under which the defendant stands convicted 
requires three (3) convictions within a ten (10) year period. The 
defendant was convicted in April 2004 for his first offense and May, 
2005 for the current offense. By definition, three convictions do not 
exist if the term 'conviction' is defined consistently to mean the time 
of sentence for both the first and last offense. To do otherwise, 
requires a judicial modification of the plain language of the statute. 
DETAILED ARGUMENT 
If the Court uses the term 'conviction' to mean the entry of 
judgment and not the offense date, the conviction of May, 2005 
exceeds the April, 1994 day by more than ten (10) years. 
If the Court uses the offense date of August 30, 2003 and 
then relates it back to the date of offense of the first offense (June 
1993), the date of offense is beyond ten (10) years. 
Either procedure precludes a felony conviction in this case. 
(0 
The result is dependent upon the definition of conviction. In 
State v. Pixton. 2004 UT App 275, 98 P.3d 433, the Court examined 
the plain language of the statute and defined a "conviction," as a "the 
result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that the 
accused is guilty as charged." 
The Court distinguished this from the term "commit" which 
refers to the act of driving under the influence of alcohol. 
The Court found the term "commit" is tied specifically to the 
date of the act but the word "conviction" refers to a judicial 
determination. Under this analysis, the first offense would be tied to 
the date of the sentencing date (April 24, 1994) and the second 
offense would be May, 2005. 
The provisions of U.C.A. 41-6-44 (6)(a) (2003) provides: 
A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third 
degree felony if it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section 
within ten years of two or more prior convictions. 
The term "conviction" was defined there in State v. Ostler, 
2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528. The Court then focused on when the 
defendant could withdraw his plea. The Supreme Court defined the 
date of conviction as the date of final disposition of the case at the 
district court. 
Here there are not three (3) convictions within the prescribed 
ten (10) years. 
U.C.A. 41-6-44 provided the following: 
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a 
third degree felony if it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section 
within ten years of two or more prior convictions; ... 
The strict reading of the statute requires that three or more 
convictions must occur within the designated ten (10) years. If not, no 
felony exists. 
The trial court chose to take some liberality with the statutory 
language. The Court used the date of offense relating to the current 
case but used the date of conviction referencing the first offense. 
Such process if forbidden by rules of statutory construction. 
Only if the language of a statute is ambiguous may resort to 
other modes of construction, otherwise the rules of statutory 
construction requires statutes be construed according to their plain 
language.O'Keefe v. Retirement Bd.. 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998). 
Unambiguous language may not be interpreted to contradict its plain 
meaning.Lorenzo v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 2002 UT App 371, 58 
P.3d 873. See also Zoll & Branch. P.C. v. Asav. 932 P.2d 592, 594 
(Utah 1997)). 
Here the trial court interpreted the term 'conviction' in two 
contradictory ways. When defining the first offense, the Court used 
the actual date of conviction. When defining the current offense 
conviction date, the trial court used the date of offense. 
The trial court should apply the strict meaning of the statutory 
language and not modify the language to deny a motion to dismiss. 
POINT TWO 
The prior conviction in 1994 for the offense committed in 1993 
produced a court record which records the conviction as a reckless 
driving. The title of the conviction is recorded as a reckless driving. 
The data entered on April 26, 1994 recorded a charged of reckless 
f% 
driving. However, the noted indicated that the City moved to reduce 
the offense to a alcohol related reckless driving. The docket then 
records a plea to the charge of reckless driving. No other supportive 
document clears the ambiguity. 
Defendant sought to exclude this conviction since it did not 
meet the mandates of 41-6-44(1) which provided that a "conviction" 
for the offense for a violation of (1) DUI violation under 41-6-44); or 
(2) alcohol, any drug, or combination of both-related reckless driving. 
The statute required minimally a proffer of facts to support the 
plea. This was to avoid any ambiguity as here. None was offered 
although subsection nine (9) provided when the prosecution agrees 
to a plea of guilty to a charge of a violation of section 41-6-45 in 
satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original charge of a DUI 
accusation, the prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis 
for the plea including whether or not there was a consumption of 
alcohol, drugs or a combination of both in connection with the 
offense. 
/9 
No documentation existed to conclude that this 1994 
amendment was alcohol related. 
CONCLUSION 
A conviction is a third degree felony only if a third or 
subsequent conviction under this section within ten years of two or 
more prior convictions. Using the logic of Ostler and Pixton as 
applied to the current language of 41-6-44, the convictions all must 
occur within the 10 year mandate. Pixton found that the word 
"conviction" refers to a judicial determination. By definition and 
applying a strict interpretation of the term 'conviction', the felony 
enhancement was not applicable. 
There are not three convictions within the mandated ten (10) 
year period. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on July 6, 2004) 
CARTER: Then on Scott Griffin, Judge, if we could 
maybe look to that one. 
THE 
MR. 
challenging 1 
as well. 
the 
was 
the 
1992 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
CARTER: 
Okay. State of Utah vs. Scott Griffin. 
Judge, on this one I filed a motion for 
the prior convictions. J 
COURT: 
CARTER: 
COURT: 
CARTER: 
Yes. 
And I think the State has responded on that 
Yes. 
We went and tried to find the recording of 
case in Provo. It's been destroyed. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
CARTER: 
You mean, 1994? 
I think — well, excuse me, ^93 case. It 
concluded in x94, yeah. This is one of those odd cases where 
date 
fact it' 
the dock 
There's 
related. 
of 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
s a . 
Dffense 
COURT: 
CARTER: 
COURT: 
CARTER: 
reckless 
is outside the ten years, but the — 
Conviction is — 
— conviction is within. 
Uh-huh. 
And there's a question there of whether in 
> driving or an alcohol reckless. Part of 
et references it as being just straight reckless. 
another portion in there that references an alcohol 
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1 I was hoping to find by the audio recording what that 
2 really was, and it's been destroyed. So I don't have anything 
3 else to offer on that. So we're probably just in a position to 
4 ask you to rule on it, unless Jared desires to have some argument 
5 on it. 
6 MR. ELDRIDGE: Judge, I think we've set it out in the 
7 memo. 
8 THE COURT: Okay, any other oral argument? 
9 MR. CARTER: No. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. The Court's reviewed both of your 
11 memorandum. Court, going by the plain language of the statute, 
12 it says, "Convictions within a ten-year time period." Clearly 
13 a conviction anticipates some type of Court record that would 
14 indicate a conviction, rather than the mere charge. There's 
15 clearly a difference between a charging document and a conviction 
16 document. Court finds that the plain meaning of the statute that 
17 says "conviction," the conviction was in I believe — 
18 MR. CARTER: '94. 
19 THE COURT: -- June of '94, which — 
2 0 MR. CARTER: I think it was April, but I don't know if 
21 that makes a lot of difference. It's within the ten-year •— 
22 THE COURT: Well, it's within the ten-year time period. 
23 The Court has reviewed the docket entry submitted. I think from 
24 a plain reading of that, without any — you know, if we would 
25 have had the tape, then we would have known much better; but it 
-4-
1 shows that there was a — says, "City Attorney moved to dismiss 
2 the registration charge and to amend the DUI to alcohol reckless 
3 driving." 
4 Based upon that, it does, you know, subsequently talk 
5 about reckless driving, but it — clearly at that point it says 
6 they amended the Information to charge alcohol related reckless 
7 driving. Court finds that the conviction was for alcohol related 
8 reckless driving; and there has been nothing to indicate that it 
9 should not — that conviction should not be used for enhancement 
10 purposes in this case; and therefore denies the motion. 
11 MR. CARTER: We probably need to set it for a trial down 
12 the road. I may be going to try and challenge -- there's another 
13 conviction in Payson. I may go look at that and see what I can 
14 do to challenge that conviction, just to put the Court on notice. 
15 So if we can have some time to do that. 
16 THE COURT: Second-place setting November the 17th? 
17 MR. CARTER: That quick? That will be fine. I think I 
18 can do my job before then. 
19 MR. ELDRIDGE: What was that? The 17th? 
2 0 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
21 MR. CARTER: 9 o'clock? 
22 THE COURT: 9 a.m. 
23 MR. CARTER: Thank you. 
2 4 (Hearing concluded) 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
) ss . 
) 
I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That this proceeding was transcribed under my 
direction from the transmitter records made of these 
meetings. 
That this transcript is full, true, correct, and 
contains all of the evidence and all matters to which the 
same related which were audible through said recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in the 
record, and therefore, the name associated with the 
statement may not be the correct name as to the speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 15th day of July 2005. 
My commission expires: 
February 24, 2008 
^B/Svei 
fNOTARY PUBLIC 
R e s i d i n g i n Utah County 
BEVERLY LOWE* 
Notary Public 
KA ^ T " S t a t e of Utah 
C S ^ J g g y ^ n Ave., Frovo. uf aJ£n J 
-1 -
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
DONALD SCOTT GRIFFIN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 031600145 FS 
Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
November 12, 2004 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE DONALD J. EYRE 
Fourth District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
PERRY R. DAVIS 
Juab County Attorney 
160 North Main Street 
Nephi, UT 84648 
Telephone: (435)623-3465 
SHELDEN R. CARTER 
3325 N. University Ave. #200 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801)375-9801 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT 
1909 South Washington Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-0027 
-2-
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on November 12, 2004) 
3 THE COURT: Okay. We'll go to the case of State of Utah 
4 vs. Donald Scott Griffin. 
5 MR. CARTER: Yes. I'm just trying to make your day 
6 interesting, Judge. Did you see that new case that came out? 
7 That's what I cited to in this case. 
8 THE COURT: Yeah, I read that case. You know, it's — 
9 again, that would be a good argument. 
10 MR. CARTER: Sounds like I'm losing on this, though. 
11 THE COURT: Well, you know, when I thought about that 
12 a little, you know, the language of that case says that it's 
13 two convictions within the ten years prior to the arrest en the 
14 new DUI. 
15 MR. CARTER: I thought the statutory language said upon 
16 third conviction. So I used — okay, well — 
17 THE COURT: I know, but I'm just citing — you cited the 
18 case of Pixen. 
19 MR. CARTER: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: Pixten, and in the language of Pixten 
21 it says, "If the defendant had been twice determined guilty 
22 convicted of an alcohol related traffic offense within ten years 
23 prior to a subsequent DUI arrest — " 
24 MR. CARTER: Okay. 
25 THE COURT: So, you know, if hadn't had that language, 
-3-
1 you knowf defense attorneys, all you'd have to do is just keep — 
2 continuing the felony DUI trial out until the ten years had — 
3 MR. CARTER: Well, that's why I didn't think it makes a 
4 lot of sense, but I'm trying to use it. Also, if you're going 
5 to say the arrest date, then arguably the arrest date in that 
6 case out to be outside the — 
7 THE COURT: Yeah, it's kind of — you know, it's kind of 
8 conflicting logic, but that's — 
9 MR. CARTER: All right. So that one is off, right? 
10 THE COURT: Yeah. So we need to — 
11 MR. CARTER: (Inaudible) in Heber? 
12 THE COURT: We need to set a — 
13 MR. CARTER: I think we already set it, Judge. 
14 THE COURT: Did we? 
15 MR. CARTER: I think we put it February 24th or something 
16 THE COURT: Let me go get my calendar to make sure. 
17 MR. CARTER: Didn't want to cut you off there, Perry. 
18 I've got it set for the 24th of February. 
19 THE COURT: It's only a second place setting on that 
20 date. 
21 MR. CARTER: Okay. 
22 COURT CLERK: So is Tamra Hendricksen a third-place 
23 setting? 
24 THE COURT: No. Well, did we do Hendricksen after we 
25 set this one? 
-4-
1 I MR. CARTER: I think we just set this one. Then Tanya 
2 called me — 
3 THE COURT: Okay, let's make this a first place setting. 
4 MR. CARTER: Okay. 
5 COURT CLERK: Then Hendricksen is the second? 
6 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
7 I MR. DAVIS: So February 24th? 
THE COURT: Yes, starting at 9 a.m. Proposed jury 
9 I instructions at least seven days prior to that time. Just so 
10 the record reflects, the Court having reviewed the new motion 
11 to dismiss and the response by the State, denies that motion. 
12 MR. CARTER: Thank you. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MR. CARTER: Have a good day. 
15 THE COURT: You, too. 
16 (Hearing concluded) 
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